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Corporate disclosure and reporting of information has become synonymous with transparency 
which in discourses idealising its value is part of the rhetoric of good governance. This notion is 
overtly conveyed in principles and codes of corporate governance practice which have proliferated 
globally over the last three decades. The possibility for transparency to conceal more than is revealed 
is considered with regard to corporate communication of information, with the consequence that 
power and real knowledge of the corporate behavioural agenda remains in corporate hands. 
Philosophically, the paradoxical and unintended outcome is that corporations are constrained by the 
norm of transparency in developing authentic moral behaviour, while also exercising power and 
control since in the information society transparency does not, and indeed cannot, lead to revealing 
all. Transparency places greater emphasis on judging, or evaluating existing organisational processes 
than on assessment of (self-)learning processes based on what actually takes place when 
corporations make decisions. 
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In various codes and regulations, transparency appears as one of the four pillars in corporate 
governance, together with accountability, responsibility and fairness. As such, both 
international and local institutions advocate transparency and sometimes impose it as 
representing clear evidence of good corporate governance practice.  
It is assumed that being morally good by being transparent correlates with being trustworthy 
(Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2016). Baume and Papadopoulos (2018) counter this widely 
held view, stating that while there is growing enthusiasm for transparency in public affairs and 
discourses idealising its value, and it is part of the rhetoric used by advocates of “good 
governance”, there is little justification for this fervour. The view that transparency underpins 
legitimacy and that it has virtuous effects is qualified by criticisms in scholarly work which 
emphasise the possible costs and perverse effects of the search for transparency, or that it 
may fail to deliver the expected benefits. What, then, is actually desired to encourage greater 
trust and responsibility? Is greater trust what is really being sought through calls for, and a 
fixation on, transparency?  
In this chapter, we attempt to unravel the considerable confusion that clearly exists around 
such concepts – for which transparency seems to act as a proxy – in the quest to understand 
what is really required for better moral behaviour from organisations. We explore 
transparency in the context of moral obligation, as part of the corporate obligation of fiduciary 
duty. The moral problem emerges when corporations are motivated only to fit the expected 
social norms of disclosure that treat transparency as a way of endeavouring to increase 
systemic trust by meeting minimal standards set by laws and rules. Baume and Papadopoulos 
(2018) argue that the causal relationship between transparency and moralisation should not 
be posited in overly mechanistic terms: transparency is not a sufficient condition for 
moralisation which necessitates other prerequisites. In this way, corporate decisions and 
actions simply are legitimated rather than scrutinized (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2015).  
Instead of merely confirming that being transparent is what a corporation ought to do, a closer 
scrutiny might provoke questions such as “What might also be possible? – “What else can be 
done?” – “What might be done instead?” In this chapter we show that calling for honesty and 
trust is neither the same as – nor is it aligned, philosophically, with – calling for transparency.  
Transparency in principles and codes of “good” governance practice 
While the quest for transparency emerged in political discourse in the late eighteenth century, 
the current widespread use of transparency is linked to, and grounded in, an economics 
literature (as part of agency theory and a game-theoretic logic) that is concerned with 
lowering transaction costs, improving market information and increasing organisational 
efficiency (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019; Baume and Papadopoulos, 2018). Schnackenberg and 
Tomlinson (2016) observed that transparency is often invoked as a balm for corporate 
malfeasance through its presumed ability to restore stakeholder trust in the firm and in the 
financial market system. In this way, transparency is seen as the answer because it lifts the 
veil of corporate secrecy (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019). Baume and Papadopoulos noted that in 
the research and debate on the causes of, and remedies for, corruption the purifying power 
of transparency is a well-established assumption.  
Transparency is valued as a fundamentally positive feature of relationships because the 
disclosure of information is believed to facilitate (systemic) trust (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019), 
although this represents a narrow focus on information and quality.  Transparency is also 
considered a standard for achieving systemic trust since it is said to open professional 
practices to public scrutiny. Transparency norms and regulations are enforced by 
transnational bodies (e.g., the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive, 2013) and in e-
government.  
ECB drama highlights the central bank transparency dilemma 
Michael McMahon, The Conversation, 6 June 2014 
“When the European Central Bank sent markets reeling yesterday with moves designed to 
stimulate growth, the 24 people who made that decision could remain comfortable that 
their exact arguments and misgivings expressed prior to the final decision would be 
shielded from public view. The broader trend though is to bring the workings of monetary 
policy out of the shadows, and that means a tricky job to balance a quest for transparency 
at central banks with a desire for frank and open discussion. 
Mario Draghi, ECB President, has spoken of the desirability of “a richer communication 
about the rationale behind the decisions that the governing council takes”. Moreover, in 
April, the Bank of England announced that they would conduct a review of the costs and 
benefits of releasing transcripts of the MPC meetings… But it is harder than you might think 
to work out what the best disclosure policy might be. The Bank of England review will look 
at what the effects might be of greater transparency. In particular, given that deliberation 
takes up the vast majority of such committees’ time, it is important to ask what the effect 
of greater transparency might be on how the committee members talk amongst 
themselves. 
The main negative effect is that transparency will induce conformity amongst members 
and lead to a stifled, and potentially useless, debate… Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, said 
of how the release of transcripts would affect the FOMC meeting: I fear in such a situation 
the public record would be a sterile set of bland pronouncements scarcely capturing the 
necessary debates which are required of monetary policymaking. 
…Both the European banks will have to structure the deliberation process in way which 
maximises the discipline effect which increases the information at hand while minimising 
the conformity effect which can deaden debate.” 
https://theconversation.com/ecb-drama-highlights-the-central-bank-transparency-
dilemma-27351 (Accessed June 4 2019). 
 
In business ethics, transparency is defined as an informational mechanism necessary for trust, 
justice, and prudence. The idea of transparency controls corporations as a form of “power 
that is created and sustained by their voluntary submission to it” (Newman 2017, p. 92). By 
being transparent, even when this is (mistakenly) based on the notion that more (i.e. full 
disclosure/transparency) is better (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 2016; Christensen and 
Cheney, 2015), individuals and corporations may believe that they are doing good morally, 
although it is impossible to know what people or corporations really think, feel and do, or 
what the corporations or their stakeholders really want.  
Fung (2014, p. 72) stated that transparency “is taking on a new meaning of more 
comprehensive and proactive disclosures instead of the release of corporate governance 
details or policies, which it is doing in a ‘reactive’ fashion” (as in the Access Info Europe case 
at the end of Chapter 2). This type of disclosure is reactive in the sense that what is possible, 
morally, to improve on is limited by what the corporation’s current reality is regarding its 
performance. This is epitomised by the auditors’ certification of what represents a “true and 
fair view” - a version of “reality” that is  established on the basis of what is already known and 
measurable according to agreed standard practices. In the previous chapter we introduced 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) rhizome concept as an alternative to the arborescent thinking 
that assumes a universal, fixed blueprint of how things should be. Instead of following an 
illusory blueprint which is closed to new possibilities and thus is self-limiting, we suggest that 
the concept of fairness be related to how auditors approach a world of differences. As Badiou 
(2002) emphasised, instead of believing in the existence one universal and unchangeable 
truth, ethical examination circles around the “unnameable”: the latent, tacit, or innate - that 
which is real although not yet articulated or actualised. “To determine the unnameable point 
of a particular type of truth-process is a difficult task for (philosophical) thought”, writes 
Badiou (p. 86), such that there are no grounds for sermonising and prescription. That is why 
humility in approach to what takes place matters, so that hubris and narcissism has no place 
in corporate leadership.  
Transparency, leading to full disclosure as both action and behaviour, is understood in 
corporate governance as establishing standards of corporate ethics to deter unscrupulous 
corporate practices while preserving a fair business environment. Many practitioners, and 
some academics, especially in finance, use the terms “disclosure” and “transparency” 
interchangeably.  
In the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), Chapter V on “Disclosure and 
transparency” explicitly states in its preamble (p. 37) that “The corporate governance 
framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters 
regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company”1. When regulators require greater transparency from 
                                                        
1 OECD (2015), G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en  
corporations they are seeking, through more disclosure, greater honesty and trustworthiness 
in corporations, to build confidence and integrity in the capital markets. These are concepts 
that we elaborate on in the next chapter. 
Transparency is disclosure  
In corporate governance literature, numerous studies view disclosure (of information) as a 
key dimension of transparency (e.g., Bushman et al., 2004; Finel and Lord, 1999; Madhavan et 
al., 2005; Nicolaou and McKnight, 2006; Pagano and Roell, 1996). The relationship between 
transparency and information is better grasped by reference to the opposite of transparency: 
opacity, which is defined as “the state of being hard to understand, not clear or lucid. When 
information is not clear or hidden, it is not trusted” (Borgia, 2005, p. 22). Borgia declared that 
transparency leads to an endless cycle of information needs: “the more we know, the more 
we demand to know, the more there seems to be to disclose” (ibid.). 
Several works define disclosure as the perception that relevant information is received in a 
timely manner (e.g., Bloomfield and O’Hara, 1999; Williams, 2008), or providing a fast, easy, 
and inexpensive means of obtaining feedback (Borgia, 2005). Specifically, transparency is 
associated with the need for stakeholders to have access to quality information to optimise 
their decisions (Braendle and Noll, 2005) and is linked to voluntary disclosure. Fabrizio and 
Kim (2017) found in the US context that financial intermediaries give better ratings to firms 
with voluntary disclosure of high quality information, especially for environmental outcomes. 
While this finding concurs with those of some studies (e.g. Griffin and Sun, 2013; Arsov and 
Bucevska, 2017), it contradicts others. 
 
Shedding more light on the black box: the new auditor’s report, Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Thomas 
Berndt, Disclose,  Issue 1, 2017, PWC 
 “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. The belief that light – in other words 
transparency – is the best protection for participants in the capital markets has been one 
of the guiding principles of regulators for over a hundred years. Transparency is supposed 
to provide a better basis for investment decisions, discourage creative accounting practices 
and generally improve the functioning of the financial markets. In past years, this has 
prompted much more stringent requirements regarding the scope and detail of the 
information stock-exchange-listed companies have to disclose in their financial reporting.” 
https://disclose.pwc.ch/25/media/pdf/pwc_disclose_1701_e.pdf (Accessed May 25 
2019). 
 
The economist Herbert Simon (1971) noted that when information becomes abundant, 
attention becomes the scarce resource. In an information-rich world, the wealth of 
information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information 
consumes – namely, the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a 
poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the 
overabundance of information sources that might consume it.2 
The question is whether being transparent is the best way of interpreting the information 
stimuli with which individuals are constantly bombarded. When stakeholders (and the public 
in general) are inundated with information it risks being ignored as merely “noise” when what 
is required is relevant information – about the company’s performance. With the explosion in 
information technology the basic but underdeveloped capacity of paying attention to what is 
important is under pressure from information overload, which in the business context is likely 
to lead to a reduction in decision quality. Overload conditions are more likely to result in 
poorer, more impulsive or hasty decisions by executives and stakeholders alike, based on the 
information at hand rather than informed decisions for which time is needed to gather and 
process the necessary information.  
Transparency based on information is associated with speediness and smoothness. Haste is 
closely tied to general inattention to what is happening and whether individuals learn from 
previous experiences or disregard them. In contrast, a desire for greater transparency implies 
a desire for increased consistency, attentiveness, and clarity of information exchanged 
between two parties (Pagano and Roell, 1996). Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) argued 
that transparency represents the intentionality of a company to share information perceived 
to be of relevance and quality by all receivers. Transparency is considered as a critical element 
of knowledge sharing (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2016). Farvaque et al. (2011) observed 
that while regulators encourage heavy disclosure academics warn of the likely high cost it 
imposes on a company. Farvaque et al. contended further that “disclosure can reduce actors’ 
incentives to look for information about the firm, and therefore can lead to an illusion of 
(potentially destabilizing) knowledge” (p. 5). 
                                                        
2 We do not regard attention solely as a resource: it is also closely related to experience, i.e., a way of attending 
reality, “an engagement” or “way of being”. Attention is often coupled with awareness understood as “a 
complementary form of intelligence” where “we can hold our thoughts in awareness”, which “gives us an entirely 
new perspective on them and their content” (Kabat-Zinn, 2013, p. xxxv).  
Sharing information is not the same as sharing knowledge, which is based on experience and 
takes time to develop. Knowledge building results from a process where received information 
is questioned and tested for its veracity and usefulness. Contiguously, there has been 
extensive debate in knowledge management theory as to how to make tacit knowledge more 
explicit, and therefore shareable (see Polanyi, 2009; Nonaka, 1994). To make what is tacit 
explicit, or to transform information into knowledge, time is needed. Nonetheless, the issue 
is whether transparency based on information, alone, however explicit it may be, is sufficient 
for generating true knowledge upon which to assess a corporation’s moral intent and 
trustworthiness.  
In Chapter 2 knowledge was explained as leading to understanding where, through a 
questioning approach to what is taken for granted, new transformative possibilities can 
emerge as pathways for behavioural change. If this space for thought or reflection is denied 
or non-existent, what remains is Han’s (2018) terror of the same. He states that “In that hell 
of sameness, humans are nothing but remote-controlled puppets” (p. 9) As we have argued, 
the norm of transparency contrives in this way to place power not in the hands of stakeholders 
who wish to assess a corporation’s trustworthiness. Instead power is concentrated and 
retained, whether in the hands of international organisations with their standards, or of the 
corporation itself according to what it chooses to disclose.  
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes. The World Bank. 
“Standards and codes are benchmarks of good practices. The Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative was launched in 1999 as a prominent component of 
efforts to strengthen the international financial architecture. The initiative aims at 
promoting greater financial stability, both domestically and internationally, through the 
development, dissemination, adoption, and implementation of international standards and 
codes. The ROSC initiative is administered by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which have recognized international standards in 12 policy areas. The World 
Bank focuses on three of these: Accounting and Auditing; Corporate 
Governance; Insolvency and Creditor Rights. The 12 policy areas fall under one of three 
broader groups - policy transparency, financial sector regulation and supervision, and 
market infrastructure: 
1) Policy Transparency 
Standards in these areas have been developed by the IMF 
• Data Dissemination 
• Fiscal Policy Transparency 
• Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency.” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc (Access Apr 29 2019). 
 
Han’s homogeneity leads to a metaphorical mute blindness in the face of a homogenised 
society where difference and diversity are removed. Similar to Tsoukas (1997), referred to at 
the end of the previous chapter, Han (2015, p. 8) further moots that “Transparency and truth 
are not identical. Truth is a negative force insofar as it presents and asserts itself by declaring 
all else false… Hyper-communication and hyper-information attest to the lack of truth - indeed 
to a lack of being. More information, or more communication, does not eliminate the 
fundamental absence of clarity for the whole. If anything, it heightens it” (p. 8). Tsoukas 
referred to this absence of clarity and lack of being as an inability to comprehend the 
complexity of the ‘world’ and what is going on. Thus we argue that transparency does not lead 
to better decisions based on interpreting information and that, alone, it does not produce true 
knowledge about, and hence understanding of, a corporation’s intent and trustworthiness. 
Instead, as Borgia (2005) and Han (2015), have argued, transparency leads to the endless cycle 
of information needs which are more likely to lead to greater opacity.  
The “new” transparency 
Bandsuch et al. (2008) concur that no single element [such as transparency] is sufficient to 
meet all the goals or ensure all the benefits of effective corporate governance. They argue 
that when principle-centred leadership, transparency, stakeholder voice, and ethical culture 
are practiced simultaneously such that they are mutually reinforcing and are integrated into 
the various policies and practices of corporate governance, the resulting synergy has the 
potential to maximise the benefits of corporate governance. These benefits include the 
rebuilding of lost stakeholder trust in business, and avoiding actions that create the risk of 
additional damage to that trust. Bandsuch et al. posit that principle-centred leaders foster a 
trustful environment that facilitates transparency, both internal and external to the firm. In 
this way, transparency engenders (systemic) trust, reinforcing the ethical governance of the 
firm and the two are thus mutually reinforcing. They see transparency as a catalyst, 
strengthening the demand for greater openness and disclosure: it is not a programme or 
process but a dynamic imperative that moves transparency beyond the narrow, traditional 
realm of financial disclosure into the larger context of stakeholder communication and the 
interaction between corporate management and constituencies beyond the shareholder and 
prospective investor. As such, they say, this reinforces the ethics of the organisation. Bandsuch 
et al. term this approach the “new transparency”. 
Fernandez Feijo et al. (2014) claim that corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting leads to 
a transparent image and reinforces the relationship between investors and the company. They 
found that pressure from some groups of stakeholders increases the quality of transparency 
of the reports. Doorey (2011) highlighted Nike and Levis-Strauss as “good examples” of those 
that play a central role in fostering supply chain transparency by disclosing lists of their 
suppliers. Graafland, et al. (2004, p. 137) stated that “the CSR of a company will only be 
correctly perceived by the public if its social and environmental value creation is transparent”. 
Thus, the increasing demands for disclosure in all types of organisational reports (annual 
financial reports, CSR, sustainability, and suchlike) reflect stakeholder expectations for a 
certain level of transparency (Dickson and Eckman, 2008; Frostenson et al., 2011; Halter, et 
al., 2009). Such disclosure underscores what Han (2015) regarded as being akin to 
pornography in a transparent society, where only by exhibiting everything can the value of 
transparency be shown. Accordingly, transparency can become a narcissistic exercise for 
corporations that fall in love with their reputational image. Parsons (2019) analyses 
“transparency reports” in “promoting change in firm and government behaviour” (p. 103). He 
concludes that these reports may become more comparable to each other over time, 
adjusting ultimately to a standard. This specific standard or norm will generally result from a 
crisis (usually local) that has led the government or industry to adopt it. Parsons also notes 
that such norms are random regarding the results they have on firms’ behaviour, such results 
being neither consistent nor convergent. 
Regardless of the extent to which examples of “good” corporate behaviour might motivate 
better behaviour in others, isomorphism may lead to pressure on corporations to share 
information for the sake of being seen to be transparent. The “good” examples might also be 
offset by actions that are to the contrary. A hypothetical example could be that of a 
corporation which might suggest car-sharing for its employees, thereby demonstrating good 
behaviour in lowering pollution. However, if the work done by the corporation is questionable 
regarding employment practices or the products produced, then what of the exemplary non-
pollution behaviour? Or a corporation might provide all of its employees with a bicycle to use 
as transport to and from work, but the good represented by a clean form of transportation 
might by negated if additional commuting time means that more hours are spent away from 
family. Examples such as this, while hypothetical, nevertheless represent real potential 
situations where deliberative thought is required to consider all possible consequences so as 
to ensure an appropriate outcome for truly moral behaviour. 
In the field of CSR, transparency is predominantly conceptualised as strategic information 
disclosure that generates organisational legitimacy and eliminates corruption. Leadership 
studies similarly link transparency to trust among followers. Management practitioners 
advocate transparency as a tool for reputation management and a way to demonstrate 
trustworthiness (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019). However, with these conceptualisations a moral 
problem arises concerning what can be shared openly if, ontologically, what is not being 
shared is seemingly non-existent. As we contended earlier, if full transparency is about sharing 
everything openly, then anything not shared either cannot exist, or it is not completely 
transparent and is therefore secret (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2015). Hence such 
ontological and epistemological questions touch upon the morality of disclosure and non-
disclosure where the act of being transparent can be seen as the corporation’s capacity to live 
up to stakeholders’ expectations. While developing this capacity may seem undeniably 
desirable, living up to stakeholders’ expectations may, perversely, minimize critical scrutiny 
of, or maximise opportunism relating to, the corporation’s practices and what corporate 
secrets are sanctioned and/or unsanctioned (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2016). Further, 
transparency in the leadership context, for example, might raise the issue of whether a 
workforce wants transparent leaders or, instead, leaders who operate with a clear purpose, 
who are capable of creating a culture worth belonging to, in a work situation that to the 
employees makes sense. These leadership attributes might not contradict the value of 
transparency: while such employees may want transparency in their corporations, they 
attribute greater importance to their leaders acting in a meaningful and responsible way 
according the values and projects with which they as employees can align.  
Whistleblowing.. the new transparency? 
Five years after historic NSA leaks, whistleblower tells the Guardian he has no regrets 
Edward Snowden has no regrets five years on from leaking the biggest cache of top-secret 
documents in history. He is wanted by the US. He is in exile in Russia. But he is satisfied 
with the way his revelations of mass surveillance have rocked governments, intelligence 
agencies and major internet companies. The most important change, he said, was public 
awareness. “The government and the corporate sector preyed on our ignorance. But now 
we know. People are aware now. People are still powerless to stop it but we are trying. 
The revelations made the fight more even.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/04/edward-snowden-people-still-
powerless-but-aware (Accessed May 29 2019). 
Information, communication and power 
As cited earlier, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) observed that in the context of 
disclosure most conceptualizations of transparency involve intentionally shared information. 
The idea of sharing information assumes implicitly that the same views and understanding of 
the world are universally held. Cultural studies have shown that this is a naïve assumption, as 
noted by Mackie (1990), so that avoiding potential misunderstandings that might affect the 
corporate image, reputation, or brand value is problematic. Consequently, corporations are 
pressured – through the moral imperative of transparency – to communicate in a simple way 
where all complexity is reduced so as to provide the information in an accessible form. 
Luhmann (1999) showed in his theory of systems that each social system (i.e. juridical, 
economic, political, and so on) communicates by reducing complexity, for example, by using 
simple dichotomies such as right versus wrong, powerful versus powerless. These reductions 
can easily lead instead to misunderstandings – especially when the reductions disclose crucial 
information which is distorted due to differences between the receiver’s and the sender’s 
perceptions and interpretations. Such misunderstandings can perpetuate, according to 
Luhmann, until the information ultimately can be presented in an understandable way, which 
often happens in relation to strategic concerns such as time and cost. For this reason, 
Luhmann places trust as an element in the communicative process because, as we argued in 
Chapter 2, neither the sender nor the receiver can have complete knowledge about 
everything. Trust becomes crucial when the amount of information grows; however, this is 
not blind trust but a flexible confidence in the other. When transparency is the norm, trust is 
minimized for both the sender and the receiver; the sender is not trusted because of the call 
for transparency and, similarly, the receiver is not trusted to understand information that 
diverges from the receiver’s expectations.  
Transparency is also viewed as a social process involving communication and mediation rather 
than focusing solely on the transmission of information. This perspective is useful in thinking 
about what happens when organisations disclose information. It can be seen as a process that 
includes components of subjects that are involved in politically motivated interpretations and 
enactments of transparency, material objects at work in transparency projects that actively 
mediate and manage the resulting visibilities, and settings which are the loci of transparency 
projects such as transnational institutions or virtual networked organisations. These 
components, each complex in themselves, are indicated from research to be entangled in 
socio-material practices able to modify whatever they seek to make visible or transparent. 
Transparency is thus theorised as a social process with generative capacities, producing new 
relationships, understandings and phenomena by virtue of being an assemblage of 
normativity that mobilises actors to respond in certain ways. Thus, consistent with Beauvoir, 
theorising transparency as a flow of plentiful and timely information is criticised as being too 
simplistic and may provide only a partial understanding of the phenomenon. 
It is also important to distinguish between more versus better information, as well as to 
acknowledge that information typically is distributed asymmetrically (Braendle and Noll, 
2005). Useful information, as defined by Bateson (1979, p. 5) “is a difference that makes a 
difference”, where the question is not quantity, but relevance and value. Furthermore, 
knowledge is part of a power-relationship that defines the terms under which it is shared, with 
whom, in what form, and for what reason. Knowledge is embedded in such power-structures, 
whether between managers and employees, or the corporation and its stakeholders. Because 
information, and potentially, knowledge is conveyed through transparency, it thus also 
operates under the mantle of power.  
Loveluck (2015, p. V) attested that “a considerable amount of research has already been 
directed at understanding the rationale of the information and communication society. Its 
sometimes distant origins have been explored extensively in order to uncover an underlying 
ideology, doxa, utopia – a “religion” even. In much the same way as the concept of 
transparency has been promoted, these analyses have drawn attention to the non-critical and 
doctrinal way in which information and communication are presented as providing solutions 
for improving social organisation. Attention has thus been drawn to implicit or explicit political 
dimensions of the information society, or “information capitalism”, according to Loveluck, 
who contended “that these discourses and representations are firmly associated with “neo-
liberalism”…which emerged prior to the Second World War but truly gained momentum 
during the liberal-conservative revolutions of the late 1970s” (ibid.). He argued further that 
“from this perspective, the development of information and communication technologies has, 
above all, served economic policies of market deregulation, privatization of public services, 
and the growth of finance and free trade” (ibid.).  
Seeing like the market; exploring the mutual rise of transparency and accounting in 
transnational economic and market governance 
Mehrpouya, A., Salles-Djelic, M-L. (2019). Accounting, Organizations and Society.  
“The shift to transparency in global governance has been shown to have been heavily 
influenced by the rise of various private actors including the Big Four accounting firms as 
powerful global actors (Suddaby et al., 2007)… Such reliance on transparency in the name 
of various publics (increasingly imagined as investors) and their imagined actorhoods, has 
led to the side-lining and weakening of state-led regulation of economic actors (Merino & 
Neimark, 1982)”. 
 
Loveluck asserted in his paper regarding the advent of hackers concerning the debate 
surrounding intellectual property and protection of privacy of information, that one of their 
main maxims “is that the obfuscation of private communications, together with transparency 
of information of public interest (including private enterprises), is the only way to rebalance 
power between the government (or monopolistic companies working in collusion with it) and 
individuals – in accordance with the motto: “privacy for the weak and transparency for the 
powerful” (p. XV). This is demonstrated in the worthy but illusory efforts of Access Info Europe 
(Chapter 2 case example). For this reason information capitalism represents not only 
surveillance of the citizens but also transforms them into passive consumers with “likeable” 
or “good” behaviours that serves to concentrate ever-growing power in the hands of the 
technology giants like Google.  
Information may manipulate, knowledge may emancipate. The power associated with 
information is mainly derived from the consideration of information and knowledge as being 
interchangeable in the common use. Information as power has unique qualities: it can 
generated at very low cost (it costs nothing to move it around), it is an infinite resource, and 
has extended usefulness. Disclosure empowers the company to produce a favourable 
corporate image against which it will be publicly judged or evaluated, even if at the same time 
it conceals a “hidden shame”. 
Disclosure and self-judgment 
Sartre expressed shame as an inability to be true to oneself, or as being inauthentic. Viewing 
oneself as powerless to act according to one’s own free will brings a sense of  bad faith. Shame, 
in this sense, is the impossibility of being honest or acting in accordance with one’s own 
values. This can be illustrated by a hypothetical example where a medical doctor is forced by 
a rigid time-management protocol to see a specific number of patients per day, regardless of 
their problems or illnesses. The doctor may be transparent about reaching his or her 
objectives but feel ashamed (in Sartre’s sense) or guilty about not living up to the Hippocratic 
ideals of the medical profession where each particular patient or situation should be treated 
with proper care but where to do so might contravene the imposed managerial performance 
objectives. 
Transparency in this instance might prevent an important debate about professionalism and 
what is required to deliver a good service. Similarly, shame in Sartre’s sense may occur when 
a corporation is forced to make decisions based on regulatory guidelines that it may not see 
as relevant to, or appropriate for, their business but which it cannot afford to breach (Janning, 
2015). For example, companies in chocolate industries are forced to use a certain detergent 
to clean their machinery even though they know that its use could ultimately be harmful for 
human beings. Here, transparency – acting (inauthentically) according to what makes sense 
economically and following industry rules – is more important than acting truly (authentically).  
A project developed by Volans and the Global Reporting Initiative  
The transparent economy: Six tigers stalk the global recovery—and how to tame them 
 
“What is the future for sustainability—sometimes called ‘non-‘ or ‘extra-financial’—
reporting? This is the question addressed in The Transparent Economy, the product of a 
project developed by Volans and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The task: to begin 
looking out to the year 2020, analysing the trends that will drive or constrain greater 
transparency and accountability. The study included an online survey of the GRI 
community, focusing on seven major trends—subsequently boiled down to the TIGERS 
agenda (Traceability, Integrated Reporting, Government Leadership, Environmental 
Boundaries, Rating and Ranking, and Shadow Economies). Recommendations are made for 
business, financial institutions, governments and individuals.” 
 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Explorations_TheTransparentEconomy.
pdf (Accessed May 26 2019). 
 
Shame can be seen as the other side of transparency. It is easy to say “privacy for the weak 
and transparency for the powerful” (as cited above from Loveluck). The weak, in today’s 
achievement society are those who lack prestige, status and power, those who do not hold 
the so-called “right” values, according to current social morals. The weak can also include 
people without work, those who smoke tobacco, drink or suffer from excess weight; it can be 
those who break down due to the pressure of today’s society, although those who return from 
stress or burnout often are considered heroes (Janning, 2017a). Only the so-called strong can 
afford to be transparent. This is especially so since there is no shame in being inauthentic. This 
notion concords with neoliberalism where status and prestige are easily identified and related 
to economic power. 
The core of the problem with transparency, therefore, is as Deleuze (2002, p. 35) argued in 
saying that we “have opposed knowledge of life in order to judge life, in order to make it 
something blameworthy, responsible or erroneous.” Instead of being committed to, and 
engaged in, the challenges and possibilities presented by each situation, as Badiou proposed, 
life (or the particular situation) is evaluated according to transcendental ideals regarding a 
sphere outside of life (e.g. Plato’s world of ideas). As averred by Badiou, ethical decision-
making concerns the limits of our current knowledge and, as such, the possibilities for 
addressing moral dilemmas are constrained. It is for this reason that corporations can act 
responsibly in that they respond to what is actually occurring rather than merely complying 
with certain ideals. A corporation that cannot be held to account as responsible for its own 
actions according to its own conscience (rather than to some externally imposed ideal) cannot 
be regarded as ethical. 
Transparency places greater emphasis on judging, or evaluating existing organisational 
processes than on assessment of (self-)learning processes based on what actually takes place 
when corporations make decisions. Since no corporation can be (fully) transparent about 
everything, it will lend itself constantly to negative judgment as being not sufficiently 
transparent, especially when matters come to light at a later time which are judged negatively 
by society. Examples abound where corporations have found themselves on the wrong side 
of responsible decision making, resulting in scandals and tragedies usually relating to 
avoidable harm; such as the James Hardie and Johnson and Johnson asbestos cases and the 
claims for compensation for sufferers of mesothelioma; Union Carbide and the Bhopal 
disaster in India; BP and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico; or the Chinese 
infant milk tragedy where milk formula was laced with melamine; and many more. The social 
need for increased transparency clearly reflects a social lack of confidence in, or mistrust of, 
companies because of their irresponsible behaviour driven by the capitalist cult of profit 
maximisation. Paradoxically, society, or more specifically, stakeholders, through regulators, 
expect corporations to act responsibly by following particular social guidelines, rather than 
being judges of their own behaviour. 
Viewed in existential terms, a corporation might conform in an outwardly transparent way to 
a particular corporate image according to the wishes and expectations of dominant 
stakeholders, rather than align with the intention of transparency for its own sake. Thus, the 
corporation shifts its responsibility for its actions away from itself and onto another – the 
stakeholders – according to the moral baseline defined by that other, rather than taking that 
responsibility upon itself. This does not necessarily imply irresponsible corporate behaviour: 
most social moral baselines make good sense. However, as we have argued in this chapter, 
such moral baselines are built on past experience, vary geographically, and are seldom judged 
by an impartial third party. These baselines are also subject to power struggles and dominant 
thinking, generating moral codes and practices established and agreed to by activist lobby 
groups or stakeholders who have a specific interest in the company’s performance outcomes.  
We advocate viewing attention (as discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to Badiou and 
Simon) as more than a scarce resource: it can be developed so as to build a capacity for 
deepening and enriching experience. Corporations become morally more conscious by 
enrolling themselves into moral reasoning and ethical questioning. This can take place in what 
Aristotle referred to in Ethics, as  “noble leisure”; what Han (2015) philosophised as the time 
of “non-doing,” or “a peace time”; or what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) called “intervening-
time”. The concept of “non-doing” also resembles elements of mindfulness in that there is no 
need for constant action, allowing things to unfold at their own pace, to adjust to the rhythm 
of life (Janning, 2017b). Such a space can be the antidote to the obsession with transparency 
in our current control society, where people and corporations – often unconsciously – are 
coerced into participating in continuous, ongoing, positive communication. 
The following case study illustrates the problem with transparency when there is a semblance 
of openness about a corporation’s decisions and performance, yet all is not what it seems. In 
this case the publicly listed company met the regulatory requirements for disclosure and 
reporting so that over its history investors supposedly had an informed view of the 
performance of their investment. However, the true position was concealed over many years. 
In this case questions arise regarding board competence and intellectual honesty, as well as 
issues of responsibility and accountability, which were not averted by - or may even have been 
exacerbated by - a full disclosure regime. It is a case in which Sartre’s shame and guilt is 
exemplified by the board of directors chaired by a former prime minister whose high status 
and public profile may have fended off questions that could otherwise have been asked about 
competence and capability as a director and board leader, in favour of the prestige and 
reputational value such a person could be thought to bestow on a corporation. The major 
questions, however, are whose real interests in this instance ultimately were served: the 
board of directors, employees who lost their jobs, sub-contractors whose businesses were 
jeopardised or that failed as a consequence, the community that would benefit from the 
completed construction projects, the investors, or wider society? And to what extent has a 
transparency regime facilitated corporate trustworthiness? This latter question is the focus of 
the discussion in the next chapter. 
  
Case example. Chapter 3 
 
The Demise of Mainzeal: Anatomy of a Corporate Downfall 
This story is the anatomy of the collapse of a New Zealand publicly listed construction company. 
Notable in this widely publicised High Court case is the statement by the former prime minister who 
chaired the board that there was openness between the company and its parent - but this was patently 
unsupported by any legal formality - so much for transparency! As one headline stated, it is a big deal 
when a former prime minister is found guilty by the High Court. 
At the time of its demise, Mainzeal was held by Richina Global Real Estate which was part of Richina 
Inc, an independent and closely held New Zealand-headquartered Asia Pacific holding company. 
Mainzeal Property and Construction Ltd was one New Zealand’s leading property and construction 
companies until being placed into receivership and then into liquidation in February 2013, owing 
creditors $110 million.  
Mainzeal had been involved in delivering US$7.5 billion of construction projects across New Zealand 
and employed more than 500 people. The company was founded in 1968 as a branch of Mainline 
Corporation Ltd, an Australian company, to develop harbour-front land in downtown Auckland, New 
Zealand, as part of Mainline-Dillingham-Fletcher. Mainline Contractors Pty Ltd was established from 
this base and in 1969, became Mainline Corporation of New Zealand, a publicly listed New Zealand 
company, adopting the name Mainzeal Corporation Ltd in 1975. In 2006 Mainzeal experienced some 
financial setbacks, posting large losses associated mainly with three large apartment developments in 
Auckland and a 12,200-seat Arena. However, the losses on these projects were recovered, with 
Mainzeal's pre-tax earnings reaching a US$1.6 million surplus compared to a US$2.8 million loss in the 
previous year. Following the Christchurch earthquake in 2010 Mainzeal was appointed by insurance 
company, Vero, as their preferred partner in a joint venture, in their efforts to rebuild Canterbury. In 
2011 Mainzeal expanded its services to include facilities management and entered the residential 
market with a division called Mainzeal Living. 
The Richina holding company was created when Mainzeal acquired (and subsequently sold) a New 
Zealand leather business. In 1996 it changed its name to Richina Pacific (retaining the Mainzeal name 
for its construction unit) and began investing in China, where its owners saw major business 
opportunities. Richina Pacific delisted from NZX in January 2009 and went into provisional liquidation 
in 2013, handing over its financial statements to the Companies Registrar for the financial years leading 
up to its demise. The financial reporting obligations of the Mainzeal and Richina group of companies, 
were murky due to various amalgamations and restructures leading up to its ultimate collapse. The 
registrar decided the only entity in the group obliged to file financial statements was Richina Pacific, 
which arose because the company was an issuer. It was initially registered as a local company, but later 
relocated to Bermuda, moving to the overseas company register. 
Mainzeal, it turned out, had been propped up like a sad puppet, taking advantage of clients' cash 
before it paid it out to workers, kept afloat when really it should have collapsed years before it did, in 
2013. But few people knew the full extent of its problems, at least not until issues were laid bare on 1 
March 2019 when the 178-page High Court decision was released. It told a story of withheld money, a 
lame business, leaky buildings, broken promises, false hopes and all-round corporate ineptitude which 
resulted in the Court making a $36 million ruling for reckless trading against four of the company’s five 
directors. 
The judge described how the company, once said to have been New Zealand's third largest 
construction company, traded while insolvent for several years. It had an annual turnover of $270m-
$380m, and used that cash flow from clients to its advantage before handing it to subcontractors. 
The judge said Mainzeal was milked by parent Richina Pacific to buy lucrative assets in China, and told 
it would be supported, but was given little cash to back that up. By 2009 Mainzeal had loaned Richina 
$42m, meaning the company was insolvent and had been since 2005. 
"At the heart of the plaintiff's reckless trading claims," the judge said of the action brought by the 
liquidators against the directors, "is the allegation the company was insolvent as a consequence of the 
Richina Pacific group extracting considerable funds from Mainzeal for investment in China. Mainzeal 
nevertheless continued trading in an insolvent state for years." The ruling referred to the Mainzeal 
directors being told by the Richina group about how the money would flow one day. "Directors relied 
on promises from the Richina Pacific group that financial support would be provided when needed."  
A new director appointed to the Mainzeal board a year before its collapse raised questions early on, 
but Dame Jenny Shipley (the former prime minister) and the other directors rejected allegations that 
the company was insolvent, or that they had acted unreasonably in relying on Richina's support for the 
company to stay afloat. Yet those directors had nothing in writing — no contracts giving guarantees, 
nothing formal or legally binding. What were they thinking? The new director joined the board only in 
2012, a year before the collapse, and "almost immediately … identified the significant underlying 
issues," the judge said. Without Chinese support, the director realised, Mainzeal would go under and 
it needed a significant cash injection — specifically, $20m as preference share capital or subordinated 
debt. 
From Richina Pacific's side, stringent Chinese foreign exchange restrictions limited Richina's ability to 
fulfil its promises. So how did Mainzeal limp on? Belief in the Richina promise and a quirk in the New 
Zealand construction sector which allowed Mainzeal to use a rich cash flow. Time was on its side. Then, 
time ran out. 
Mainzeal's clients paid it for work by the subcontractors and the company retained that cash to keep 
itself afloat, "effectively using this money as its working capital", in the words of the judgment. At the 
same time Richina Pacific was using Mainzeal as its own cash cow, "extracting more funds for the 
benefit of the group from Mainzeal than was recorded in the audited annual accounts", the decision 
said. "Richina Pacific had extracted considerable funds from Mainzeal. This had been done to help 
secure assets of considerable value in China," the judge said. These transactions were completed via 
loans which were recorded as assets on Mainzeal's books. 
But at times, Richina was also generous. For example, the judge noted how a developer could not 
complete a commercial block in the Capital City, Wellington, so Richina paid $37.4m to Mainzeal so it 
could finish the project, then sell it at a profit. The money was returned to Richina in the form of loans. 
Richina also supported Mainzeal by guaranteeing money for construction bonds so it could win work, 
and sometimes it even put up the entire bond, the judge said. 
Mainzeal's demise could be traced back to 2004 and 2005, when capital was extracted from the 
company for Richina Pacific to buy assets in China, including the Shanghai Leather company, today 
worth more than US$700m ($1 billion). In 2005, Mainzeal recorded a significant operating loss of 
$12.1m, and although it was profitable in 2006 due to the sale of a major completed construction 
project, it lost money in subsequent years. In 2009, former Prime Minister Shipley resigned from the 
Richina board but kept her Mainzeal directorship. That same year, the judge noted, the company was 
insolvent, with negative equity of $44.8m. 
By 2012, Mainzeal had building weather-tightness liability provisions to address, at a crippling $21.8m. 
But the company had another monster in its midst called the Siemens contract, where payments were 
withheld for work under dispute. During 2012, Mainzeal experienced cash flow problems, mainly due 
to issues with Siemens, the company contracted to upgrade the country’s electricity link between the 
North and South Islands. That upgrade required work at each end of the link and Mainzeal won the 
job. The company’s PwC auditor told the court of his "considerable concerns" about Mainzeal and how 
he lost confidence relying on Richina’s assurances. The auditor was grateful when PwC lost the 
company as an audit client. Shipley knew of PwC's scrutiny and acknowledged there was "no question 
that Mainzeal was reliant on its parent in balance sheet terms". Richina was "open and clear with 
Mainzeal directors", she said, and spoke in the Court of their support. But there was an absence of 
relevant letters of support from any Richina entity for the benefit of Mainzeal, and due to a 
restructuring, Mainzeal was no longer a wholly owned subsidiary of Richina Pacific. The ex-Mainzeal 
chief executive and fellow director was also unconcerned about balance sheet solvency at the time, 
"because Mainzeal always had the cash flow to pay its debts". 
The ruling by the High Court of $36 million against three of the four Mainzeal directors and the director 
of Richina Pacific is the highest amount awarded in New Zealand for reckless trading. 
 
Sourced from: 
“Mainzeal: Anatomy of a corporate downfall” Anne Gibson, NZ Herald, 1 Mar 2019. 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12208241  (Accessed 
15 Mar 2019). 
“How Mainzeal collapsed and tarnished a former PM’s reputation” Rob Stock, Stuff, Feb 26 2019. 
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/110867141/sinking-shipley-how-mainzeal-collapsed-and-
tarnished-a-former-pms-reputation (Accessed 15 Mar 2019). 
“The Mainzeal collapse and what could’ve been done differently” Duncan Cotterill, 
https://duncancotterill.com/publications/the-mainzeal-collapse-and-what-couldve-been-
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